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The Myth as a Theory of Human Action:
Perspectives From Plato and Sorel
STUART C. GILMAN
Eastern Kentucky University

For us, modems, a myth is only a myth because we can no longer
connect that time with the time of history as we write it, employing
the critical method, not can we connect the mythical places with
our geographic space. This is why the myth can no longer be an
explanation; to exclude it etiological intention is the theme of all
necessary demythologization. But in losing its explanatory pretensions the myth reveals its exploratory significance and its contribution to understanding, which we shall later call its symbolic
function-that is to say, its power of discovering and revealing the
bond between man and what he considers sacred.
PAUL

fucomm, The Symbolism

of Evil

The myth, lie, symbol and metaphor have been constant sources of
philosophical inquiry since Osfris and Isis first cohabited near the fertile
valley of the Nile delta. The purpose of this paper will be to examine
Plato and Georges Sorel as two staunch advocates of myth. And, in
doing so, investigate their use of myth in their distinct political philosophies. Within this context, the first responsibility of any inquiry is to
begin with a cursory review of the way each author used the myth.
For Plato there were two types of myths or lies: a lie of the soul
and a mere lie in words. The diHerentiation is that the former is an
unknowing lie while the latter is a conscious lie. A lie of the soul comes
from ignorance, not from knowledge, and should be condemned because
it is used without an understanding of its possible consequences. The
mere lie in words is a myth created to protect or educate fellow men
who do not have the capability to understand abstractio:as. This appears
to be Plato's purpose in developing the guardian class who must use
myth because they "possess a coherent body of abstract knowledge
concerning the source of human unity-which they cannot explain in
full detail." 1 In fact the argument has been made that the Republic
itself is a myth because its purpose is not to praise a certain type of
1
John Wild, Plato's Modem Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, Chicaio,
1968, p. 52.
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community, but rather to urge the validity of a principle; that "politics
is a vain business unless it is subordinated to an understanding of the
good for man." I. M. Crombie continues by stating "A myth then, of
the kind to which the eschatological myths of the Georgias, Phaedo and
Republic belong, is a story such that, if the story were true, that would
be an implementation of certain principles." 2
Sorel concretized the myth in what he termed the general strike.
The general strike had to remain as potential in a dialectical conte~t
with the actual to maintain its viability as a threat. In other words, the
general strike had to be real enough for all men to believe in it yet
could not be actualized without losing its effectiveness. Sorel perceived
three levels of strikes:
( 1) The proletarian general strike---.it is the strike of the proletarian
workers to overthrow the capitalist society.
( 2) The political general strike-it is related to the goals of socialists in parliament and government.
( 3) The economic strike-improvement of the status of laborers. 3
Sorel was indifferent to the economic sb.'ike because it did not enter
the political realm and tended to erode the potential threat of the
political and proletarian strikes. Violence, as a conscious rather than a
passive activity, was conceived of as a potential tool. Violence could not
be feared by the workers because the capitalists would then view the
threat of the massive strike as a mere ploy. The purpose of the myth for
Sorel was to establish the worker as the actual source of socialism in
society through the threat of ,the general strike.
The purpose behind this cursory introduction to Plato's and Sorel's
conceptions of the myth is to lay the foundation for an examination of
the meaning of th e myth in political philosophy. Susan Langer has
created a typology of the myth in which:
The myth is characterized by its serious nature, the entrance into
the public realm, and the appearance of universal symbols. The
concern of the myth is not utopian 'or wiseful distortion of the
world, but serious envisagement of its fundamental truths; moral
orientation, not escape.' 4
2

I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, London, 1966, vol I,

p. 153.

Irving Horowitz, Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason, Carbondale, Ill.,
1968, p. 85n.
·
4 John G. Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time, Middletown, Conn., 1968,
p. 29.
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This paradigm appears to be a bit stagnant so, in addition to the above
three criteria, the concept of praxis will be appended to it. The reasoning behind adding a praxical dimension to the myth will be explored
below.
Many philosophers feel the myth is totally alien to what modem
man understands as a fairy story or fictional table. Cassier ( Philosophy
pf Symbolic Forms) justifies the use of the myth as a heuristic device
~hicb attempts to interpret the universe rather than a pragmatic :fiction
which is dismissed when measured against standards of truth. "The
myth (is) a form of symbolization with a truth and meaning of its own
for the mythic mind as a stage in the differentiation or evolution of
consciousness." 6 The importance of this argument is that the myth is
purposeful and has a specific function in political thought.
Authors, such as Levi-Strauss, Cassier and Ortega y Gasset, have
dealt with the concept of myth. But none, at least from my own perspective, have ever tried to explicate the question of why political myth is
necessary for "conscious" political activity. This paper will peripherally
explore the concept of political activity in terms of its relationships with
the myth. But, why pick on Susan Langer? The problem with Langer
is that she is so close to an excellent explication of myth that just missing
she destroys the concept. The argument which will be advanced in this
paper is that her framework for analyzing myth is stagnant. That is,
stagnant in the biological sense of an 'unmoving, unliving body'. It
appears that she totally leaves out human motivation-in terms of praxis.
She worries about constructing theory, as morality, without its consequences or interrelationships with human activity.
We must construct the morality of a new age, a new world, and
that means a new morality. This cannot be done by adopting some
simple new idea and making an 'ism' of it-humanism, existentialism, Freudianism-and setting up a few general principles by which
all familiar ethical rules are henceforth to be measured. It can only
be done by analyzing and perhaps redefining not only obvious
ethical aspects of life, but the nature of life itself, and individual
life, and mentality, society and many other subjects. 6
It appears that Langer has posed two poor alternatives which are
not mutually exclusive. This paper will attempt to show a way to go
beyond this dilemma by viewing myth in Plato and Sorel from a modified typology. What follows is that attempt.
6

0

Ibid., pp. 28-29.
Susan K. Langer, Philosophical Sketches, N. Y., 1964, p. 151.
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Langer's first criterion for myth is its serious nature. For both
Plato and Sorel the myth was an instrument from which one could
understand and communicate concepts which could not be easily understood. For Plato the myth was used as a device to communicate
complex abstractions to the common man. Thus , allowing all men to
have at least the understanding of political abstractions to allow them
to live "justly" in the polis. "In Plato the myth retains the seriousness
of its 'truth' but is at the same time consciously an imaginative play,"
writes Gunnell,
As the creative mind gains mastery over the symbols of the myth,
as with the tragic poets, the myth becomes the medium for expressing the new freedom of the psyche . . . What to the adult
appears to be play is seriousness from the perspective of the child.
The difference between the creative man and the child or those
living in the cultural myth is the consciousness not the seriousness
that he had as a child at play. From Plato to Heidegger the myth
stands at the portal of being.7
In a real sense Plato creates a dialectical unity between fiction and reality through his use of the myth while at the same time allowing the
absolutely free development of the psyche without pedantic tutoring.
The synthesis of these two mediums , the abstract and the real, within
the myth establishes the seriousness of Plato's effort to give an understanding of the forms to all classes of the polis.
Sorel demands that the myth be taken seriously because it is the
key to his political theory . The myth is not utopian for Sorel. The
myth elicits action while a utopia is limited to an intellectual process.
"Myths lead men to prepare themselves for a battle to destroy what
exists," writes Richard Humphrey, "the utopia has always had the effect
of directing men's energies toward reforms that could be effected by
taking the system piecemeal." 8 The purpose of the myth is to lead men
into direct action in the public reahn. Therefore, consciousness, which
comes through the myth, leads to political action and change.
The second characte1istic of the myth in Langer 's typology is the
entrance into the public reahn. This public realm is in1portant because
it brings the myth into the political dimension and allows the myth to
act in the character of the exemplar for public action. In other words,
the myth gives all men a limited understanding of their role in the
public sphere and how to best actualize that role. The "myth, like political philosophy," suggests Gunnell,
Gunnell , pp. 147-148.
s Richard Humphrey, Georges Sorel, Cambridge , Mass., 1951, pp. 173-174.
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provided a vision of the origin or source of order and carried with
it a perscription for ordering existence from the point of this ground
upwards . ..
The myth provided a theoretical bridge between human order
and the order of nature, and this integration of society and the
cosmos was predicated on the lack of symbolic differentiation between the two spheres. Social existence is experienced as a cosmic
analogue and reality is a function of the initiation of a celestial
archetype. 9
The function of the myth can now be seen as providing a link between
the form and the real for Plato, while for Sorel the myth, as a general
strike, establishes a coherent understanding of the abstract concept of
socialism.
Specifically for Plato the myth is used when he can no longer use
mysticism or first form logic to explain his ideas. Through the use of
myths he enters the public realm because the myth requires the reader
to play an important paTt in the act of communication. "It also gives
a fair indicator that the matter under discussion is seen as vitally important to Plato himself," Robinson points out,
For the myths tend to be about man and the divine, conduct in
this world and bliss or punishment in another, free will and destiny,
birth and death: ideas in a word, which engage man, and form the
well springs of action. 10
~his is why the myths play such a vital role in the Republic. Plato
realized that it did not matteT who the author of the myth was or what
his intention was, because the myth would be unconsciously taken as
an exemplar of action; this is especially true if the myth portrayed the
action as good or honorable. Plato states this point clearly in the
Republic:

First, as it seems, we must supervise the makers of tales; and if they
make a fine tale, it must be approved, but if it's not it must be rejected. We'll persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved
tales to their children and to shape their souls with tales more than
their bodies with hands .11
The myth becomes the omphalos of the Republic because the mere lie
in words is the source of its existence . Man can only exist in community
9

Gunnell, pp. 30-31.
T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychol.ogy, Toronto , 1970, p. 60.
11 Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato, N. Y., 1968, pp. 55, 377c.
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if the reality of his situation is communicated in terms with which he
can cope. This is why it is so very important to have absolute control
over the myth makers, even if all the myths are not believed by everyone. The importanc e of this noble lie is that it is persuasive and comes
into being due to specific need within the political realm. 12 At this
point the lie enters public space and becomes political, therefore supporting Lan ger's contention , at least for Plato , that the myth enters the
public realm.
The myth for Sorel provides the opportunity for a radical, i.e., in
the same sense as the German grund, entry of socialism into the public
realm. The sole purpose of the potential general strike is to allow the
worker to feel that he can aocomplish effective political action, and in
this way the myth of Sorel works much like the Platonic myth. Sorel's
myth creates a noetic foundation of action which is dialectical b ecause
it relies on the int erpenetration of the intellect and of the real world .
"Sorel's conception of the term 'myth' is entirely a dynamic one:;" asserts Humphrey ,
unlike utopian ideals , it is not affected by criticism of detail or
even by the apparent failure of its believers to attain the ir aspirations . . . These myths may never be fulfilled, but they provide ,
nonetheless , an indispensible incentive to action. 18
Phr ased in a different way, Sorel created the my,th as a Platonic form
of political action where the general strike was alway s the unatt ainable
goal for which the proletariat must constantly reach. Refiecti ons on
Violence can thus be interpreted as a myth in much the same way that
I. M. Crombie evaluates the Republic as myth: It was absol utely necessary to the success of socialistic syndicalism to have Sorel create the
mythical image of the general strike and political violence be cause it
made these actions viable alternatives for the workers and rea l to the
bourgeois. There is now justification for stating that Sorel's strik e must
dramatically enter the public realm before it becomes myth. In other
words, Sorel's myth cannot remain as pure intellectual activity.
The appearance of universal symbols is Langer's last criteri on for
the myth. This last section of her typology can be divide d into two distinct properties: that of ontology, in this case time, and psychology, or
the relation between the symbol and the mind. Time is place d within
an ontologic al state because myth is by definition timeless and exists in
athanasia ( from the Greek a thanatos or the negative of death). Tbere12

Ibid., p . 93

1a Humphr ey,

° 414c.
p. 171.
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fore time itself becomes the myth's source of being, manifesting itself
as ;nmordial time qua universal symbols. "Time in the myth is not
really time at all, but the eternal present of primordial time," writes
Gunnell,
which is, in effect, 'articulated atemporality' or 'intemporal time' ...
'a moment without duration as certain mystics and philosophers
conceive of eternity.' Primordial time is the time of cosmic creation,
and the events narrated in the myth are continually made present
and serve as archetypes which give meaning to experience.1'
Plato treats the Republic as a myth, without the limitations of time.
The myth allows the human mind to freely create using his lie in mere
words as both a myth and a model. This independence of human action
is essential for both Plato and Sorel because the human dignity found
in the independence of right or moral choice is the foundation of their
politics. "And we should treat such tales as spells to pronounce over
ourselves," writes Plato, "as in fact has been my own purpose all this
while in telling my long story." lfi By pronouncing 16 Plato uses a pedagogical device to allow one to reflect on the applicability of the myth
to the specific situation. In this sense all myths for Plato are timeless
precisely because they are metaphors for timely action, that is, a human
being can understand the need to apply myth in his own historical time.
Phrased differently, the myths transcend time by relating an implicit
knowledge of actual experience within them.
Sorel agrees with Plato as to his universal conception of the myth.
Plato used the lie in mere words to transcend the arguments of the orators, and Sorel used the myth of the general strike to negate the affect
of the Marxist phenomena of scientific socialism. "Myth is needed to
overcome the probabilistic world of scientific fact," suggests Horowitz,
"Ideology, the conscious representation of class interests, is the basis
of social practice. 17 Their ability to stimulate activity is the supreme
measure of the worth of ideologies." 18 The universal symbolism within
u Gunnell, p. 25.

John Rist, Eros and Psyche, Toronto, 1964, p. 11.
Pronounce comes from the Greek and Latin sources of pro nunciare or before
announcing. It also has the connotation of a public or official declaration of decision.
It seems what Plato is telling us "by treating such tales as spells to pronounce over
ourselves" is that one should measure the fit of the myth before pre-dictating action.
This allows man a pre-action cognition, thus radicalizing for Plato the human free-dom of choice.
17
Pratiquer in the French can be translated as both fractice and praxis; it
would seem that the translator used an unfortunate choice o words because "social
praxis" would seem to be a much more applicable and appropriate concept in this
context.
18 Horowitz, p. 133.
15

16
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mythology allowed Sorel to coterminously create a theory of history and
a command to human action. In this manner Sorel was free to use his
observations to criticize other socialist thinkers without endangerin g
socialism. The Decomposition of Marxism is his most scathng work on
other socialist thought. His main critique of Marx appears to be Marx's
failure to create a more provocative myth than the communist state. 1 9
One of the major functions of the myth is its ability to create a
human timeliness with regard to its moral dictates. In fact, "the connection between political philosophy and fabrication is evident;" writes
Gunnell, "it is the desire to create something that would transcend the
instability of action perfmmed in time." 2 ° From here Gunnell's argument falls apart because he tries to separate "knowing" and "doing". As
C. S. Kirk put it: "dubious comparisons between verbal and action symbols had better be left on one side, as had 'adjustive responses,' which,
if they exist in any sense, provide only a small proportion of the total
reasons for making, telling, and listening to myths. 21 Myth is a natural
extension of political philosophy and allows the philosopher a mode of
communication without the limitations of pure understanding or intellect in the Kantian sense. Thus, the intellect is transcended through
praxis which seems to be an essential ingredient of myth; and it will
be explored as such below.
The second characteristic of the universal symbol is its psychology
or the relationship between symbolic forms and human perception. To
understand Plato's psychology one must first comprehend what Plato
meant by philosophy: Philosophy had four distinct functions for Plato:
( 1) protreptic, introducing the student to philosophy . . . ( 2) the
criticism of sophisby and ungrounded speculative opinion; ( 3) dialectic, the process of arriving at exact definitions which lay bare the
formal structure of the world as a whole ; and ( 4) mythical speculation . . ., concerning the nature of the supreme principle and the
ultimate destiny of the soul. 22
From this definition it can be easily perceived that Plato saw the myth,
and symbolism deriving from the myth, as essential to philosophical
inquiry. Symbolism is a very important concept for Plato because it
allows him to draw the distinction between myth and allegory. He does
not condemn allegory as nonsense but rather sees it as less important
than myth. J. A. Stewart has written that "Allegory is dogma in picture
19
20
21
22

Horowitz, pp. 207-255.
Gunnell , p. 142.
G. S. Kirk, Myth , London, 1970, p. 25.
John Wild, Plato's Theory of Man, Cambridge, Mass., 1946, p. 94.

THE MYTH

AS A THEORY OF HUMAN

ACTION

117

writing, but myth is not dogma and does not convey dogma." 28 The
point is that symbolism in the myth is in no way dogmatic, instead it is
prescriptive. In this way the myth only establishes parameters of action,
allowing freedom of human will which is essential to Plato's concept
of the polis.
Sorel's four major works, Reflections on Violence, The Illusions of
Progress, Materials of a Theory of the Proletariat, and The Decomposition of Marxism reflect an over-arching concern for the psychological
aspects of the myth. Symbols within the myth, e.g. proletariat, were
designed to anchor the myth to reality. "Bergson's psychology provided
a foundation to Sorel's myth of the general strike," writes Horowitz,
since images, unlike the mystique, were a human creation and not
something found in the spirit of society. Bergsoris human being was
manipulatable and plastic, 'an object destined to move other objects.' Man becomes 'a centre of action' rather than a centre of cognition.24
The essential point is that the idea of malability of the human spirit
must preceed any notion of the effectiveness of the myth. Because man
is plastic, the myth can create moral imperatives while still leaving
optional action, or human freedom, a real possibility. This is why a
stark distinction is made by Sorel between the propaganda lie, as in the
totalitarian state, and the myth. "Sorel did not suggest that myths be
created and imposed on a guiless proletariat by their overlords;" suggests HUITiphi-ey,"rather he sought to recognize appropriate images of
conflict and movement already in existence so that they might be made
to function in the process of heroic action springing from the workers
themselves." 2G The purpose of the myth is not brain washing or even
argumentation , but rather it is directed toward revelation. The truth,
which is abstract and difficult to understand for the common man, is
revealed through the symbolism of the myth. It can be easily understood now why Sorel used the symbol of the general strike as the foundation of his myth; the strike was a real and concrete mechanism which
the workers, and citizenry in general were familiar with from their contemporary labor situation. The general strike was realistic because it
was an amplified version of a previously experienced phenomenon. In
this way Sorel tied the symbolism within the general strike to a basic
understanding of the abstract concept of socialism. Or in the words of
Sorel:
28
24

Rist, p. 9.
Horowitz, p. 52.
u Humphrey, p. 29.
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We have seen that the idea of the Syndicalist general strike contains within itself the whole of proletarian Socialism; not only are
all its real elements found therein , but they are moreover grouped
in the same way as in social struggles , and their movements are
exactly those proper to their nature. It would be impossible to find
any image which could be contrasted with the proletarian conception of it as represented by the general strike. 26
Langer's typology of the myth as discussed above, does appe ar to
be descriptive of the myth itself. However , her characteristics seem to
be in stasis or without movement; which is totally alien to the myth of
Plato or Sorel. Praxis within the myth would appear to be the ideal
category to add because it would create a dynamic level for Lang ers
delineation of the myth. The praxical concept is intimately relate d to
Plato and Sorel, if not all makers of political myths because the purpose
of the myth is to take understanding out of the intellectual realm and
move it into the dimension of action .
The praxical mood is reflected in the Platonic dialogues beca use
all of the myths are concerned with a dialectical mode which combines
thought with action or a transcendental focus between form and reality. 27 Plato uses the myth as a vehicle to communicate his concept of
moral action, and moral action cannot be separated from thought . Right
thought for the Greeks cannot be described from right action- there
simply is no distinction between "can" and "will". Therefore, for Plato
if a man thought moral thoughts he could not help but act upon them.
"Since the world constitutes being-in-becoming ( for Plato), it is not
the ultimate reality ," writes John Gunnell ,
and the types of knowledge and accounts belonging to it are also
not ultimate ; the forms are apprehended by intellection while of
the world there is only true belief or trust ... the dialogue attem pts
not only to give an account of the construction of the universe but
to tell about 'the gods and the generation of the universe' and to
render the truth of the creation and describe how things in the
world strive toward the good and have come to possess rati onal
order. This is possible only through myth which is neither intellection nor opinion. 28
The gist of this quotation is that the myth , because it is praxical, obtains a certainty which is impossible through normal intellect or opinion.
It is objective because it gives opinion which can be understood without
26
27
2s

Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, N. Y., 1912, p. 177.
Wild, P"lato's Theory of Man, pp. 205-206.
Gunnell, p. 188.
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reason and outlines moral imperatives which are accepted due to a
radical freedom which holds the responsibility of right action; in the
sense that the myth is free because it responds to the particular value
systems.
Sorel's pr axis comes from a basic understanding of Marx's thought
and a vehement rejection of the bastardization of praxis in the Marxist
thought of his day. Myth is an interpretation of reality because "the
myth is an expression of will," explains Humphrey , "and the ends are
significant not in themselves but only because action is governed by
them as if they were a true representation of reality." 29 But within this
reality man is again only free in action, "and the sterility of modem
civilization, the impot ence of man, is due to a lack of forms or myths
suitable for the expression of the common will. 8 0 The myth brings the
praxical elements to man where he can unite his will and his action;
and this is why Sorel sees man free only within a societal myth.
Praxis, as a dimension of the myth , allows man to escape from the
aesthetic values and to use the aesthetic in a material way:

Le judgement moral est, le plus souvent, mele a des judgements
esthetiques ; il ne saurait l'ailleurs exister sans ceux-ci, car il presuppose que toute activite a ete provoquee par une determination
raisonnee. 81
Sorel used his irrationalism to establish a praxical, aotive radicalism
which was based on "the superiority of the myth of projective impressions over critical judgment. 82
The problem with which both Sorel and Plato are trying to deal is
how do we make men act politically in their own interests? The myth
becomes the key to this motivation because it tells men how to become
politically heroic. It is Camus who brings the romantic movement of
the nineteenth century into focus by illuminating the grandeur of the
spirit of rebellion-it makes liberty synonymous with rebellion. 88 However, Plato, in a more limited form, saw it as the attempt to give the
attributes of the gods to common men. This heresy is the necessary
political step. It is the move to take religiocity out of the heavens and
give it to man. It is man who acts politically and the myth is the vehicle
which convinces him that he can act. For Sorel, heroism takes the form
of collective action. It is the myth which allows workers to stand together and cope with the concept of the general strike. Heroism is the
Humphrey, p. 11.
13.
Georges Sorel, Materiaux d'une Theori.e du Proletariate, Paris, 1929, p . 195.
32 Horowitz, p. 2.
aa Cf. Albert Camus, The Rebel, N. Y., 1956, pp. 140-148.
29

so Ibid., p .
81
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essential psychological element of the myth because man is always
afraid of the liberty an activity can afford him . The uncertainty of liberty is the same unc ertainty involved in death-the innnitude of possibility. The myth must fill that void or else no political movement can
take place.
Plato believed that each individual had the ability to cope with
liberty by making him become heroic, radical, in terms of his own interests. Sorel did not have th at sort of confidence in the individual, and,
following in the tradition of Rousseau's general will, found the possibility of liberty most promising in terms of collective action. But, the
idea of heroism is essential in the myths of both authors . The ability
to convince the common man to become uncommon is the essence of
revolution. And Plato and Sorel found it the essential element into the
transformation of the "common" state to the rule of the philosopher
king or socialism . This is an aspect of political myth which is avoided
by most philosophers dealing with myth. Yet it is the crux of the political myth, because the political myth must go beyond rhetoric and into
activity.
Both Plato and Georges Sorel used the myth as a device to communicate and reify political idea for the common man. The point of
this paper was to show that there are four distinct dimensions of the
myth, based on Susan Langer's origin al typology of three , in which the
writings of Plato and Sorel can be analyzed . Admittedly , this paper is
far too brief to go into the full depth required to analyze each of the
authors. But, it is a demonstration as to the value of such an inq uiry .
The praxical category is especially important because it takes into account human action which both of the authors perceived as manifes t.
Although Plato and Sorel used the myth for different purposes, it appears that they used it in the same way. Plato was attempting to instill
morality and Sorel was trying to incite revolution. But both were striving to obtain a theoretical base to human freedom.
This revision of Langer's original typology presents an intere sting
question: Do all political myths have a praxical dimension? H this
question can be affectively answered it would radically change philosophical thinking about such authors as Fredrich Nietzsche and Rousseau. However, this is far beyond the scope of this paper. Wha t has
been demonstrated is that both Plato and Sorel used the myth as a
method for communication and they also understood the myth in tiie
same way, i.e., as a political device. The myth becomes a radical form
of empiricism, giving both a theory of history and an ethical mode. In
the myths of Plato and Sorel understanding comes neither from peda ntics nor force, but rather from myth.

